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For start-ups, a successful crowdfunding campaign could generate significant opportunities to access 
additional funding resources. This paper contributes to advancing our understanding of how 
characteristics of a successful Kickstarter campaign may determine a start-up’s follow-on fundraising 
performance, with a special focus on future VC financing. We draw on 483 successfully crowdfunded 
projects on Kickstarter and more than 80 follow-on venture capital (VC) investments throughout the 
period 2010-2018 to investigate how various venture quality attributes (e.g. high pledged amount, strong 
social media alliance) and uncertainties (e.g. large number of backers) contribute to the subsequent 
increase (or decrease) in VC investments. Our results show that larger public investments (i.e. pledge 
amount) signal greater public confidence, translating into significant rise in the probability and amount 
of subsequent VC financing. We also find that founders’ professional connections (in LinkedIn) factor 
in the venture’s future funding success by raising both the probability and number of subsequent VC 
rounds. Statistically significant results were found supporting our hypothesis that VCs tend to devalue 
a large crowd of backers, presumably due to future market loss concerns. Both the probability and the 
number of follow-on VC rounds were negatively affected by a high number of backers. Finally, we show 
that serial creators with back-to-back crowdfunding successes are more likely to go back to the crowd 
for future funding needs which translates into higher probability, number and size of subsequent 
crowdfunding rounds. However this strong association was not found to be negatively affecting the 
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Over the last decade, we have been observing the growing emergence of crowdfunding within the early-
stage financing industry; allowing founders of entrepreneurial, cultural, or social projects to solicit 
funding from many individuals, i.e., the crowd, in return for future rewards or equity (Mollick 2014). 
Traditionally, entrepreneurs with innovative ideas in need of financing have relied on supply of capital 
from venture capital investors (VCs) and angels, in addition to more traditional intermediaries, such as 
commercial banks (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 2014). For a long time, these were commonly the most 
sought-after sources of external financing available to start-ups, due to the uniqueness of their operations 
and investment practices. Beyond supplying the necessary capital, one of the most important ways in 
which intermediaries such as VCs nurture entrepreneurial firms is through a combination of intensive 
monitoring, help in developing high-quality management teams, and contacts and credibility with 
suppliers and customers (Sapienza, 1992; Barney, Busenitz et al, 1996; Sapienza et al. 1996). Not 
surprisingly, this form of ‘coaching’ is documented to have led to stronger growth and performance in 
portfolio firms (Chemmanur et al., 2010; Bertoni et al. 2011; Chemmanur et al., 2011; Puri and 
Zarutskie, 2012; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Croce et al., 2013; Aggarwal et al. 2015).  
Thus, for any start-up company, the capability to raise equity capital from a venture capitalist or a 
syndicate of venture capitalists constitutes a crucial and visible achievement. However, to receive VC 
funding business ideas undergo a profound selection process through a specialized investor, making the 
number of start-ups that eventually receive investments from VCs incredibly low. In 2019, VCs made 
investments worth $55 billion US dollars, although that capital was only distributed across 2,771 deals, 
compared to the nearly 32.5 million businesses in the US1. 
Crowdfunding, as an alternative funding source for early start-ups, has, therefore, rapidly gained 
popularity by allowing founders to bypass the venture capital industry and supporting products and ideas 
which would otherwise not be pursued. The growth of the crowdfunding industry has been phenomenal, 
with the size of the world crowdfunding market expected to reach USD 28.8 billion by the end of 2025- 
a 16 percent increase from the cumulative average growth rate in 2018.2 Since its founding, in 2009, 
Kickstarter, a leading platform for reward-based crowdfunding worldwide, has launched more than 
472,000 crowdfunding campaigns, with 37.49% successfully funded by more than 17 million 
individuals.3 A typical reward-based crowdfunding campaign is intended to communicate the project's 
mission and vision readily and is designed to collect modest amounts from a large number of backers 
(Mollick et al. 2015). This form of crowdfunding treats funders as early customers, allowing them access 
                                                          
1 https://www.statista.com/chart/11443/venture-capital-activity-in-the-us/ 
2 https://www.marketresearch.com/QYResearch-Group-v3531/Global-Crowdfunding-Size-Status-Forecast-12411297/ 




to the products produced by funded projects at an earlier date, better price, or with some other special 
benefit. And through their investments, individual backers express their interest in using the product and 
their belief in its successful development. Products are therefore not developed based on the perceptions 
and wishes of imaginary customers. (Kaminski et al., 2019). 
However, as for any other funding mechanism in the capital markets, crowdfunding also has its fair 
share of challenges and criticisms. While supporters of crowdfunding say it can be interpreted as a 
positive signal of market acceptance by monitoring early adopter consumers’ reactions (e.g., Strausz, 
2017), critical voices argue that turning to crowdfunding indicates a failed “litmus test” of being able to 
convince a reputable professional investor. Furthermore, given that project backers are usually less 
sophisticated and inexperienced individuals, they may not choose to pledge for a start-up based on the 
same amount of background experience or with the screening expertise of professional investors, such 
as VCs or angel investment organizations (Bonini et al. 2019).  
 
Nevertheless, there has been a fundamental shift in these beliefs with more research findings supporting 
the view that the crowd actually makes accurate, expert-like assessments (Mollick and Nanda, 2015), 
and relies on signals (Ahlers et al., 2015; Mollick, 2013). Contrary to the notion that backers are a group 
of mostly ‘uncoordinated amateurs’ prone to choose ‘lemon’ projects, it has been showed that 
aggregated group decisions tend to be more accurate than decisions by individuals in which only a single 
decision maker relies on his sole assessment (Budescu and Chen, 2014; Larrick, Mannes, and Soll, 
2011). Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) went on to demonstrate that, over 90% of successfully 
crowdfunded projects remained ongoing ventures 1-4 years after their campaign and such success 
provided the creators access to outside funders. To be specific, high sums of (reward-based) 
crowdfunding, collected fast by start-ups is found to have a positive effect on VC managers’ funding 
decisions (Mödl, 2018). Kaminski et al. (2019) showed that crowdfunding volume and VC investment 
volume are strongly correlated and concluded that an increase in crowdfunding investments Granger 
causes subsequent VC investments. While a successful campaign does not necessarily guarantee the 
support of VCs, crowdfunding investors surely fulfil a complementary role to VC investors’ decisions, 
by providing them with information towards new products and product categories, particularly in sectors 
where the crowds are end users. 
 
This paper examines how VCs interact with crowd-based decision making in a reward-based 
crowdfunding context, considering successful fundraising as strong quality signals. We base our 
research on the premise that capital investments by VCs entail a high degree of uncertainty and a large 
difference between the knowledge of capital-seeking entrepreneurs and capital-providing investors 
(themselves) about the true quality of a start-up (Amit et al., 1998; Busenitz et al., 2005; Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001). As a result, they tend to address this asymmetric information problem by relying on 
signals of quality, that are observable at the time of the investment decision helping them to correlate 
with the non-observable determinants of the start-up quality (Hoenig & Henkel, 2015; Stuart et al., 
1999). This thesis therefore seeks to identify the impact and effects of certain observable characteristics 
of a successful crowdfunding campaign on VCs’ subsequent screening decision.  
 
We draw on 483 successfully crowdfunded projects on Kickstarter, a globally recognized reward-based 
crowdfunding platform, and more than 80 follow-on venture capital (VC) investments throughout the 
period 2010-2018 to investigate how various venture quality attributes (e.g. high pledged amount, strong 
social media alliance) and uncertainties (e.g. large number of backers) contribute to the subsequent 
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increase (or decrease) in VC investments. Furthermore, the effect of successful entrepreneurs’ strategy 
of serial product launch (to leverage the existing backer-base) on follow-on VC funding has also been 
explored. We simultaneously examine the effects of these signals on follow-on crowdfunding and non-
crowdfunding rounds (e.g. debt financing, equity crowdfunding and others) too.  
 
Our results show statistically significant empirical evidence that higher pledged amounts significantly 
raise the probability of getting subsequent VC financing. We also found significantly positive 
association between pledged amount and the number of follow-on VC rounds and the amount that is 
subsequently raised through VCs. Next we find that having well-connected CEOs or founders (in 
LinkedIn) is significantly positively correlated to both the probability (of securing) and number of 
subsequent VC rounds. However, amounts subsequently raised from VCs were not found to be 
significantly correlated to the number of connections the founder has in LinkedIn. Statistically 
significant results were found supporting our hypothesis that VCs tend to devalue a large crowd of 
backers due to governance or future market loss concerns. Both the probability and the number of 
follow-on VC rounds were negatively affected by a high number of backers although no significant link 
was found between backer size and amounts raised from follow-on VC rounds. In our fourth and final 
analysis, we move away from the VCs and shed light on the founders’ perspective. Here we find 
statistically significant results showing that entrepreneurs who’ve successfully crowdfunded multiple 
projects are more likely to return to the crowd for future financial needs; in other words, higher number 
of prior successful campaigns translates into higher probability, number and size of subsequent 
crowdfunding rounds. However this strong association was not found to be negatively affecting the 
degree of future VC involvement, as initially hypothesized.  
This paper adds to several streams of academic literature, the first being the emerging field of 
crowdfunding (e.g. Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb, 2015; Ahlers et al., 2015; Lehner, Grabmann, and 
Ennsgraber, 2015; Cumming and Johan, 2016; Mollick, 2013, 2014; Mollick and Kuppuswamy, 2014; 
Mollick and Nanda, 2015; Schweizer & Zhou, 2017; Günther et al. 2018; Cumming, Hornuf et al., 2019; 
Proelss et al, 2019 to name a few). Second, our study is also related to the literature on venture capital 
selection criteria (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Hall & Hofer, 1993; MacMillan et al., 1985a; Shepherd, 
1999; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984) and extends the stream of research on the role of observable qualities 
that signal a new venture’s quality (Amit et al., 1990; Conti et al., 2013; Haeussler et al., 2012; Hoenig 
& Henkel, 2015; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008). We specifically draw from the school of literature that have 
shed light on the compatibility of crowdfunding with traditional venture capital. Ryu and Kim (2019) 
show that projects that experience a positive crowdfunding outcome may sometimes lose access to VC 
financing ex post. Colombo and Shafi (2016) find empirical evidence that successful crowdfunding can 
either facilitate or hinder VC financing ex post. Our paper complements these empirical papers by 
identifying different sources of quality signals and uncertainties inherent in a successful campaign that 
VCs observe and incorporate in their investment decision. 
The structure of this study is as follows: section 2 formulates the testable hypotheses and elaborates on 
the related literature while developing each. Section 3 goes through the methodologies that we used in 
this study along with the descriptive statistics and regression equations. Next we present the empirical 
results gathered from the regressions in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the findings and provides a 
discussion on and limitations of this study while suggesting the possible avenues for future researchers. 
Lastly, section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
Angels and Venture Capitalists (VCs hereafter) face high levels of information asymmetry when 
deciding whether to fund a company. Brand new companies have no track record or established product 
or service for investors to rely on; and oftentimes, these companies are merely an idea, prototype, or 
product in its infancy (Ibrahim, 2018). Due to new ventures’ information opacity combined with a 
limited lending history, most new and small entities have problems with credit access from mainstream 
lending institutions like banks (Binks et al., 1992; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). Such difficulties hamper 
new innovative ventures from getting much needed seed and start-up capital (Colombo & Grilli, 2007).  
Since investments are uncertain, investors often need to act on potential signals of quality. As per Spence 
(1973), surrounding the plethora of observable characteristics and attributes of a subject are the quality 
signals that will ultimately determine the selection process and justify taking the risks. In other words, 
these signals can reduce the asymmetry as they serve to inform potential investors about a company’s 
quality when that quality is otherwise difficult to observe. 
New companies which choose to crowdfund were previously said to signal a weak company suggesting 
that the choice sends a negative impression that the business was not able to secure traditional funding 
sources earlier (Herdrich, 2015). In other words, many of the start-ups that choose to pursue 
crowdfunding as a means of raising capital do so because they have no other options, and they may still 
struggle to raise traditional venture financing in future (Green et al., 2016). Further concerns were- while 
expert-based investing has a proven track record, crowd-based wisdom cannot be the best at judging 
new business ideas (Ibrahim 2016) meaning small investors are likely to lack the financial sophistication 
and experience of venture capitalists, who are generally highly knowledgeable about valuing start-ups 
and assessing founding teams (Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 1994). Not surprisingly, bandwagon effects have 
been reported too (Mollick, 2013), where additional investors come on board when momentum is 
building up. Adding to the list, there were also questions about lax disclosures and the potential for fraud 
(Hazen, 2012). 
Arguing the opposite, several studies suggest that crowdfunding does not always send a negative 
signal—and in important respects is a better alternative than other means of early financing. It is well 
positioned to capitalize on the wisdom of crowds and, instead of adverse selection, the ‘wisdom of the 
crowd’ theory suggests that, in most cases, crowdfunders will do a relatively good job at picking winners 
(Schwartz, 2015). The crowd has been reported to be surprisingly rational in their decision making, 
despite the potential for herding and madness (Mollick and Nanda, 2015). Mollick (2013) even showed 
that, entrepreneurial quality is assessed in similar ways by both VCs and crowdfunders. The first 
empirical study to associate signaling with funding success was conducted by Ahlers et al. (2015) where 
results showed that small investors do effectively interpret observable signals of venture quality and 
level of uncertainty sent by the entrepreneur before committing their financial resources to certain 
projects. 
Therefore, receiving crowdfunding can be viewed as a signal that crowd investors are convinced of the 
project’s growth potential, i.e. a successful crowdfunding campaign shows potential future investors that 
a company has a real customer base and that there is demand for its product or service (Mollick, 2013; 
Agrawal et al. 2014; Beckwith, 2016; Mollick et al, 2016; Ibrahim, 2018). As a result, venture capitalists 
can potentially benefit from crowdfunding by having entrepreneurs eliminate some of the questions 
around whether a market exists for their product or service (Fleming et al., 2016). This, in turn, may 
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also lead a project to receiving VC investments, since it serves as a proxy for its commercial potential. 
Successful projects in crowdfunding are shown to be positively related with ex-post performance (Kim 
and Viswanathan 2019). Mollick et al. (2014) suggest that crowdfunding generates additional benefits, 
even after the end of a campaign, such as direct access to customers, media, employees, and, most 
importantly, to venture capitalists. Drover et al. (2015) show that crowdfunding can act as a certification, 
making it easier for firms to obtain financing ex post. 
Evidently, VCs invest significant time and energy in the screening process and the evaluation of relevant 
quality signals (Amit et al., 1990; Hall & Hofer, 1993; Inderst & Müller, 2004). Research on the criteria 
venture investors use to evaluate potential deals indicates that, overall, VCs emphasize four broad 
categories of start-up characteristics when making investment decisions: the management team, the 
product or service, the market attractiveness, and the venture’s financial prospects (Petty & Gruber, 
2011). However, as the latent “value” of these characteristics are often opaque, it’s understandable that 
VCs will resort to the quality signals coming from a crowdfunded campaign that correlate with these 
characteristics in order to guarantee themselves the minimum respectable return on investment. 
Generally speaking, start-ups raising large amounts on a crowdfunding platform are more likely to 
attract the attention of VCs. In other words, the larger the public investments (i.e. pledge amount) the 
greater the public confidence, meaning market-validation is revealed by the amount of money raised in 
the campaign. In this context, Colombo & Shafi (2016) and Kaminski et al. (2016) showed that larger 
collected crowdfunding pledges correlate with higher and faster follow-up funding by VCs. Therefore, 
in line with their hypotheses we are also interested in examining the association of pledged amount with 
future VC funding outcomes to see whether their findings hold for our dataset as well. For this purpose, 
we use three separate parameters, namely a) the probability of getting subsequent VC funding, b) the 
number of subsequent funding rounds and c) the amount raised in subsequent funding rounds. Hence, 
we formulate our first set of hypotheses as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (a): Larger amount of pledged money is positively associated with higher 
probability of future VC funding. 
Hypothesis 1 (b): Larger amount of pledged money is positively associated with higher 
number of future VC funding rounds. 
Hypothesis 1 (c): Larger amount of pledged money is positively associated with higher 
amount raised in future VC funding rounds. 
 
Besides using the amount raised in the campaign as a signal for venture quality, anecdotally, VCs are 
increasingly conducting “due diligence” on social media platforms as well and reacting favorably to 
successful start-ups with effective social media performance. Social network ties have always been 
found to be important in crowdfunding (Borst et al., 2017; Lukkarinen et al., 2014). Early stage firms 
use social media to communicate with their target stakeholders, such as customers, backers and 
investors. Studies have shown that social media promotes word-of-mouth information diffusion (Aral et 
al., 2013; Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Dellarocas, Zhang, & Awad, 2007; Forman, Ghose, & 
Wiesenfeld, 2008; Zhu & Zhang, 2010) and serves as a platform for greater consumer engagement with 
a product or brand (Chen, De, & Hu, 2015; Ghose & Han, 2011; Goes, Lin, & Au Yeung, 2014; Li & 
Wu, 2018; Miller & Tucker, 2013). Other group of studies further show that the use of social media can 
influence overall firm performance, including the success of early stage firms and their ability to obtain 
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financing (Mollick, 2013; Agrawal et al., 2010; Hsu, 2007; Shane and Cable, 2002). Previous research 
on social media with respect to crowdfunding involved studying the creators’ or firms’ Facebook 
accounts (Cumming et al. 2017; Chung et al., 2015; Rishika et al., 2013), Twitter account (Kaur et al. 
2017; Jin et al. 2017), YouTube (Fietkiewicz et al. 2018) in addition to the product’s websites. Taking 
inspiration from those papers, we too study the interaction between founder’s social media alliance and 
the firm’s future funding prospects, focusing on a more business-oriented media, LinkedIn, and its 
impact on the project’s capability to attract future rounds of VC financing. 
 
Unlike Facebook and Twitter, LinkedIn is designed to help the creators build network with companies, 
organizations, and professionals, among others. With its professional nature and its purpose to create 
business openings, it helps create legitimacy and build trust among investors (Vismara, 2018). And the 
advantages are twofold when it comes to enhancing future funding prospects. First, the very presence 
on a large social media platform, such as LinkedIn validates the project’s authenticity by significantly 
lowering the chances of the campaign being fraudulent. As the argument goes, failure to provide 
legitimate information can incur emotional cost to the entrepreneurs once the fraud is uncovered to all 
their social media connections, thereby resulting in a loss of social capital (Baum and Silverman, 2004; 
Cumming, Hornuf et al., 2019). Second, the existence of various business-oriented interest groups in 
LinkedIn allows new or less experienced investors (i.e. potential backers) to take cues from the experts 
and connect with aspiring business owners online through the website, especially in times of uncertainty 
(Malaga & Mamonov, 2018). Statically, LinkedIn is more than 277% effective than Facebook and 
Twitter for lead generation.4 Such professional connections not only factor in the success of the 
campaign itself but also determine the venture’s future funding success by enabling the entrepreneur to 
be discovered and provide additional information to potential investors for a better evaluation of the 
quality of their probable ventures (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Stuart et al., 1999; Roma et al., 2017). 
Vismara (2018) pointed out that public profile of investors on LinkedIn plays a key role in attracting 
other investors in early days. In their study, Amsden & Schweizer (2018) found that well-connected 
CEOs or founders with 500+ connections significantly enhance ICO (Initial Coin Offerings) funding 
success (as measured by token or coin tradability), referring this as an indicator of broader networks, 
which correspond to greater social alliance capital. 
In a nutshell, prior studies have attributed funding success to higher number of LinkedIn connections. 
Therefore, just like other characteristics of a successful campaign, founders’ number of connections 
becomes a metric of interest for professional investors, i.e. the campaign’s success further cements the 
necessity of incorporating those numbers in VC’s decision-making process, as those networks can be 
used to rigorously promote and advertise the venture’s future products.  
Since most participating firms in Kickstarter are connected to LinkedIn, it is possible to determine how 
many LinkedIn connections each founder or other key personnel have and whether they have reached 
the 500+ contacts benchmark. We are hence interested in investigating the leverage of the project 
owner’s social media alliance (measured by- a) presence in LinkedIn and b) founder’s 500+ connections) 
and how it impacts its future funding prospects.  
                                                          
4 In a recent (2018) study of over 5,000 businesses, HubSpot found that traffic from LinkedIn generated the highest visitor-







Hypothesis 2 (a):  Higher social media alliance is positively associated with the probability 
of getting future VC rounds. 
 Hypothesis 2 (b):  Higher social media alliance is positively associated with the number of 
VC rounds received by the entrepreneur in future. 
Hypothesis 2 (c):  Higher social media alliance is positively associated with the amount 
raised in future VC rounds by the entrepreneur. 
 
Clearly, the information obtained from the campaign (such as those discussed above) can guide the VC 
in making sensible investment decisions by enabling them to interpret the quality signals. Academics 
have also ventured to explore other attributes of a campaign and studied their effectiveness as quality 
signals, e.g. speed of collection (Mödl, 2018), speed of product delivery (Colombo et al. 2016), location 
and industry of the project (Ryu & Kim, 2016). However, signals originating from a campaign cannot 
only be sent on purpose but also unintentionally (e.g., Janney & Folta, 2003; Daily et al., 2005). 
Signaling theory emphasizes that signals can be productive, but need not always be (Spence, 1974a). 
Therefore, founders might – by primarily seeking the productive function (e.g. accessing financial 
resources) – involuntarily send unintended signals that might communicate negative information to 
receivers. It has been demonstrated that the entrepreneur’s decision to run a crowdfunding campaign 
may introduce certain disadvantages to the VC. For instance, in their study, Roma, Gal-Or & Chen 
(2018) argued that, crowdfunding reduces the size of the future market for the VCs, given that they do 
not receive any portion of the contributions of the fans raised in the campaign. In contrast, as they state, 
“if the entrepreneur does not launch the campaign, fans become part of the future consumer population 
and the revenue generated from them are split between the VC and the entrepreneur.” Therefore, if the 
group of backers is relatively big, this loss to the VC can be substantial as the reduced market size will 
directly affect future project revenues. 
In contrast to such concern, a stream of literature has spoken of the importance of the number of people 
who contribute to a crowdfunding campaign. The more backers a campaign attracted, the more likely 
the product was to exceed financial goals when it’s launched to the mainstream market (Stanko et al. 
2017). For the community of professional investors this carries an important signal who do take into 
account the number of backers while making their decisions. Due to the high risk of backing start-ups, 
VCs many times do not invest until a company has validated the market, gained traction, and 
demonstrated it can execute the project5. And because backers put down money for a product that has 
yet to be produced, the number of backers may serve as an early indication of the enthusiasm for the 
product (Agrawal et al. 2014). Crowdfunding backers will often take an active role in the innovation 
conversation (Mollick, 2016, Stanko and Henard, 2016) by becoming engaged in product development 
alongside the innovating entrepreneur, as that experience is typically considered by backers to be a 
rewarding part of the process (Agrawal et al., 2014, Gerber et al., 2012).  
However, while it has been established that backers are an important contributor to the later market 
success of the product, only a handful of researchers have attempted to explore the interaction between 
                                                          





their size and the future prospect of VC involvement, i.e. whether VCs’ uncertainty revolving future 
venture revenue outweighs the advantages of having a huge a backer-base.. Therefore, aligning with 
Roma et al. (2018) we are also interested in examining whether or not VCs tend to devalue a large crowd 
of backers due to future market loss concerns. 
Hypothesis 3 (a):  Higher number of backers is negatively associated with the probability of 
getting future VC rounds. 
Hypothesis 3 (b):  Higher number of backers is negatively associated with the number of VC 
rounds received by the entrepreneur in future. 
Hypothesis 3 (c):  Higher number of backers is negatively associated with the amount raised 
in future VC rounds by the entrepreneur. 
It is important to mention that, large number of backers is almost always a natural outcome of a large 
pledge which we hypothesize (Hypothesis 1) to have a positive impact on future VC involvement. In 
other words, even if the group of backers is relatively big, VCs might still be optimistic of future 
revenues if the addressable market for the product concerned is big enough in the beginning. However, 
certain successful projects, despite garnering the attention of a large crowd, fail to raise a large sum due 
to low contribution per backer, presumably signaling the VCs that even when the product is good, there 
is no attractive margin to earn. We also test this by identifying the campaigns with a large backer base 
(in the highest 25th percentile) that raised lower pledges (in the lowest 25th percentile) to see how this 
interaction translates into the VCs investment decisions. 
While the notion of our hypotheses so far has been based on the VCs perception of future opportunities 
and uncertainties related to a large crowd, it’s also reasonable to address how entrepreneurs tend to 
capitalize on the power of the community of backers. After running a successful campaign and having 
experienced the viability of crowdfunding as a financing option, entrepreneurs often resort to using 
crowdfunding campaign another time to raise additional financial resources. There is evidence that 
successful first-time crowdfunding entrepreneurs launch subsequent (follow-up) crowdfunding 
campaigns expecting that past backers' pledges will trigger future pledges and often manage to raise 
larger amounts successfully. A great example is represented by Pebble Watch. The company initially 
participated in Y Combinator, but failed to raise a series A from VCs.6 Therefore, the company turned 
to the crowdfunding website Kickstarter to raise additional funding. The first product launch raised more 
than $10M, while the second raised more than $20M.  
In line with this series of events, 2015 Kickstarter statistics7 showed that the success rate of the next 
project for a repeat creator with one previous successfully funded project is 73% while that of a creator 
with two such projects is 80%. Lee et al. (2018) even found that such serial creators who experienced 
successful initial crowdfunding are more likely to explore a new industry or product category in the 
crowdfunding market. To the VCs, such back-to-back successes possibly present them with a more 
seasoned and experienced serial entrepreneur with a better risk perception and a greater optimism to 
venture into a new territory. Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether or not, for these serial 
creators, crowdfunding still remains a lucrative funding option over the VCs.  
                                                          





Since crowdfunding is a tool that creators can use again and again, the average number of backers 
typically grows as creators fund multiple projects and leverage existing relationships with the 
community. And not only because of the strong backer-base, Colombo & Shafi (2016) showed that this 
strategy of serial product launch by the same firm also stems from the self-confidence that non-VC 
backed entrepreneurs gain after successfully shipping their promised product to customers:  
“Shipping proves the viability of the product with customers and makes entrepreneurs 
more self-confident about their execution ability, thereby rendering coaching by VC less 
attractive.” 
According to them, the availability of this mode of financial bootstrapping makes VC financing less 
appealing to entrepreneurs enabling them to avoid incurring dilution costs. In our final set of hypotheses, 
therefore, we reason that as entrepreneurs continue to choose to raise money through crowdfunding sites, 
and their projects become successful, the odds of subsequent VC involvement gradually decrease. The 
degree of an entrepreneur’s association with crowdfunding can easily be measured by looking at the 
number of projects s/he has created in the crowdfunding platforms at his/her disposal. We consequently 
formulate our fourth hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (a):  Higher number of crowdfunding campaigns created by an entrepreneur 
negatively affects the probability of subsequent VC involvement for future projects. 
Hypothesis 4 (b):  Higher number of crowdfunding campaigns created by an entrepreneur 
negatively affects the number of subsequent VC rounds for future projects. 
Hypothesis 4 (c):  Higher number of crowdfunding campaigns created by an entrepreneur 
negatively affects the amount raised in subsequent VC rounds for future projects. 
 
In summary, this thesis makes an attempt to explore the interaction between the quality signals coming 
from a successfully crowdfunded campaign and the subsequent increase (or decrease) in VC 
investments. From a signaling perspective (Spence, 1973) we argue that crowdfunding pledges, the 
entrepreneurs’ affiliation with social media along with the size of the backer community can serve as 
critical quality signals about a project’s viability in venture investor’s decision-making processes. To 
conceptualize the development of the above hypotheses, we create a framework (Figure 1) categorizing 
these attributes under three driving forces, namely- venture quality, uncertainty and founder’s incentive, 
which we believe are responsible for positively (or, negatively) affecting future VC funding outcomes.  
 
Essentially, crowdfunding pledges reflect the “wisdom of the crowd” in “screening new venture 
offerings and voting with their individual investment pledges for the best ones” (Bruton et al., 2015) 
thereby informing VCs of the product’s demand and market acceptance. Therefore, following Colombo 
& Shafi (2016) and Kaminski et al. (2019), we first hypothesize that crowdfunding volume (i.e. pledged 
amount) and subsequent VC investment (probability, number of rounds and amount) are positively 
correlated. Another aspect that is believed to indicate high venture quality is the level of association the 
entrepreneur maintains on a social media platform. LinkedIn, a prominent but often overlooked social 
network, was the primary choice for investigating the leverage of the owner’s social media network for 
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our research due to its professional nature and we argued that firms (or, founders) with mass followers 
on this platform will positively influence their prospects of being selected by venture investors.  
 
 





The third hypothesis addresses some of the VC’s concerns with respect to the visible and oftentimes 
largescale involvement of the online backer community. Aligning with Roma et al. (2018) we reasoned 
that although the large size of backers may present a strong signal of market validity, VCs might be 
skeptical towards a reduced market and, therefore, will shy away from start-ups with large number of 
small investors. For our final hypothesis, we turned our focus towards the entrepreneurs’ incentive to 
approach VCs and argued that, those who’ve successfully crowdfunded multiple projects are more likely 
to return to the crowd for future financial needs, thus, reducing (albeit not eliminating) the likelihood of 












Colombo & Shafi (2016) & 
Kaminski et al. (2019)
LinkedIn Alliance (+)
Uncertainty
Number of Backers (-)
Roma et al. (2018) 
Founder's Incentive
Number of CF Campaigns (-)





3.1 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This research is based on data of all successful Kickstarter crowdfunding campaigns over the period 
from 2010 to 2017 in the fields of design, games and technology, raising at least five hundred thousand 
(500,000) US dollars. To construct our database, we include projects that ran outside the U.S. as well 
and therefore the currency conversion rates of the respective countries while maintaining the 
abovementioned threshold.  
 
Kickstarter is the world's largest online reward-based crowdfunding funding platform, which has the 
mission to “help bring creative projects to life".8 According to its website, more than USD $4.7 billion 
has been pledged to more than 176,000 successful projects9 from its inception on April 28, 2009. 
Creators of projects apply for funding in fifteen different areas ranging from culture to technology. 
While campaigning for a project, they choose a deadline and a minimum funding goal. Individual 
funders (backers) can contribute small amounts of money starting from a few dollars. For their 
contributions they are offered rewards, which vary depending on the amount the backer contributes; 
including things like cards, t-shirts, cups, or to be one of the first that obtain the new product. Kickstarter 
operates on an All-or-Nothing basis, meaning that only when funding goals are reached the project 
creator will receive the pledged funds (Cumming, Leboeuf, and Schwienbacher, 2019) and if the goal is 
not reached by the deadline, the project ends without any funds collected. Moreover, potential and actual 
project backers may participate in online discussions and exchange their opinions about the project with 
the creator and among each other. Being a global funding platform for creative projects and nurturing a 
strong backer network and active online communication, Kickstarter, therefore, motivated our choice to 
employ it as the primary source of information although we have complemented our data using 
additional sources, such as Indiegogo, LinkedIn, and company homepages. We limited the sample to 
the period before the end of calendar year of 2017 so that we allow about at least one year10 for the 
companies to receive venture capital after the finish of the campaign. All variables on subsequent 
financing, including VC, crowdfunding, angel investments, seed funds, debt and equity crowdfunding 
were obtained using manual searches for all the projects, companies and entrepreneurs in places such as 
news articles, Crunchbase website, and investors’ blog-posts etc. The focus of this search was on- first, 
determining whether a project received follow-on investment, particularly VC, after successfully closing 
the crowdfunding campaign and second, if so, hand-collecting as many details on that funding round as 
possible (e.g. date the funding was secured, amount & currency, identity of the VCs).  
 
Our final sample consists of n=483 Kickstarter projects and a total funding volume of $591.23 million 
USD pledged by a total of 5,106,804 backers. A median project raised USD 787,490. The chronological 
sequence of the initiation date, business categories, and raised volumes (in USD) of campaigns are 
                                                          
8 https://www.kickstarter.com/charter/, accessed January 14th, 2020. 
 
9 See https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats 
 
10 This was inspired by Colombo et al. (2016): “It is noteworthy to mention that in hindsight one-year cut-off is a reasonable 
timeframe to observe financing given that (a) the average number of days for firms ever receiving a round of financing after 




shown in panel A of Table 1. We find that backers have spent approximately USD $169 million on 
projects categorized under ‘Product design’ (133 campaigns) - the highest among the 23 business 
categories covered by our sample. This is followed by Video Games (61 campaigns) which has raised 
the most money within the “Games” business category (USD $88 million). Campaigns by country for 
each respective year are shown in panel B of Table 1. Approximately 73% of the sample campaigns 
were launched by creators in the U.S. (352 projects), followed by creators in the U.K. (27), Canada (17), 
Australia (15) and Germany (9) among others. 
 
--- please insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
Using information from the campaign’s webpage in Kickstarter, the LinkedIn pages associated with the 
campaign/creator and the hand-collected details on subsequent funding rounds, we create 27 dependent 
and explanatory variables along with additional controls encompassing the campaign features, creator 
characteristics, follow-on investments, association with LinkedIn and so on. See Table 2 for variable 
descriptions. 
 
--- please insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for all the dependent and explanatory variables along with the 
additional controls. Sample size is reduced to 330 for the variable CEO LinkedIn 500+ (see Table 2 for 
variable description) since no LinkedIn accounts were available for the remaining projects in the sample. 
On the same note, of the total sample, 395 campaigns had a natural person(s) enlisted as its ‘creator’(s) 
thereby reducing the sample size for the variable Female Creator accordingly. Table 4 shows the 
correlation between all the twelve independent and control variables. 
 




Dependent Variables: In the empirical analysis we attempt to examine how certain attributes of a 
successful crowdfunding campaign affect future VC investment outcomes; the outcomes being- a) 
whether a subsequent VC investment was secured or not; (b) the number of such follow-on rounds and 
(c) the amount raised through these rounds. In other words, to test each set of our abovementioned 
hypotheses we introduce three dependent variables- Subsequent VC Financing (0/1), Number of 
Subsequent Financing and Amount of Subsequent Financing. To supplement our empirical analysis, we 
also explore how a crowdfunding success influences the firm’s overall funding future, considering other 
sources as well- i) fund raised from all types of sources combined (crowdfunding, seed funds, angel 
investors, venture capitalists, equity crowdfunding, debt financing and others)- SubFin, ii) fund raised 
from crowdfunding platforms only- SubCF, iii) fund raised from Kickstarter only- SubKickstarter, iv) 
fund raised from sources other than crowdfunding platforms- SubFin_notCF.  
 
Independent Variables: To test the first interaction effect of pledged amount of a project on its future 
funding outcomes described in Hypothesis 1 above, we develop our first independent variable- 
Ln(Pledged Amount), which represents the natural logarithm of the pledged amount in US dollars for 
each campaign. We use the natural log value of these variables to alleviate skewness concerns and to 
reduce the influence of outliers in the sample. Our next set of variables are associated with the project 
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owner’s social media alliance, measured by- a) presence in LinkedIn and b) founder’s 500+ connections. 
Therefore, in this set, our first variable of interest is LinkedIn Page which is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if a link to a LinkedIn page of the creator(s) and/or the project is available, and 0 otherwise. 
The next variable is CEO LinkedIn 500+ - a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO or founder (if no 
CEO is mentioned) has 500 or more contacts on LinkedIn, and 0 otherwise11. To test the effect of the 
number of backers on future funding outcomes, we include No. of Backers as our main explanatory 
variable for the third hypothesis. In addition, we also introduce the variable Backers(Q4) x Pledge(Q1)  
representing campaigns with a large backer base (top 25th percentile) and  low pledge (bottom 25th 
percentile) to capture the effect of low-contribution-per-backer projects on future VC involvement. 
Finally, for our last set of hypotheses we introduce two more independent variables to measure the 
degree of an entrepreneur’s association with crowdfunding. First, we use No. of Projects Created in 
Kickstarter - a count of the projects created by an entrepreneur in Kickstarter till date. This information 
is easily accessible from the campaign’s Kickstarter page and enlists both successful and unsuccessful 
projects alike. However, entrepreneurs often opt for campaigning for their products simultaneously on 
multiple crowdfunding platforms or try other platforms after achieving success on one. Hence, we create 
our final explanatory variable No. of all CF projects- a total count of all crowdfunding projects ever 
created by the owner, irrespective of the platform. 
 
Control Variables: We include a set of control variables that are expected to affect the decisions of 
subsequent funders. First, we include the characteristics of the project owners in our model. We assume 
that signals about the gender and composition of the project owners (a single independent person, 
company or organization) will signal entrepreneurial capacity and will influence the decisions of backers 
and future investors. Thanks to Kickstarter, we were able to include the total number of projects backed 
by the founder on Kickstarter as an additional control which, like the No. of Projects Backed 
(Kickstarter), incorporate the founder’s level of engagement in crowdfunding activity.  
Second, we control for a couple of campaign characteristics, e.g. goal or target amount, duration of the 
project and whether or not the project was marked as “Projects We Love”. The goal of a project plays a 
crucial role in securing funding given that an entrepreneur needs to have a fine balance between raising 
enough funds and, at the same time, not asking too much. A project with a target amount set too high 
runs the risk of scaring off potential investors and being a failure (Frydrych et al., 2014; Mollick 2013), 
which, in turn, sends a negative signal costing the project’s future “fundability” (i.e. affecting the 
entrepreneur’s access to VC funding). We, therefore, use the natural logarithm of the project’s goal- 
Ln(Goal Amount) as a control variable in our model. We also control for duration of the project (period 
of time in days in which projects can receive financial support from backers) due to its correlation with 
the campaign’s funding success (or, failure). While Burtch et al. (2013) stated that longer funding 
durations will lead to greater awareness, more contributors thereby more success, Mollick (2014) 
showed duration decreases the chances of success as longer durations are a sign of lack of confidence.  
The final control in this category is the label “Projects We Love”.  The Kickstarter team often marks a 
stand-out project as such when it demonstrates a robust and sophisticated project page with a clear 
                                                          
11 One limitation of using CEO LinkedIn 500+ as an explanatory variable is that this information was manually collected for 
each individual CEO/founder at the time of data collection, which have changed over time; meaning the actual number of 
CEO connections could have been lesser at the time of the campaign, leading to the possibility that the higher number of 
connections in the later years came as a natural outcome of the earlier crowdfunding success. 
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description, captivating images or video, a creatively thorough plan for completion and an excited 
community, thereby garnering the most attention.  
Lastly, we control for the industry the project belongs to (industry indicators) and the year it received 
the money raised from the campaign (year indicators). These time and industry fixed effect controls 
address the market-wide conditions that could potentially affect funding. 
 
3.3 Main Analysis: 
 
We begin with testing whether or not subsequent VC financing was secured. For this we employ a 
logistic regression model to analyze how our main explanatory variables- Ln(Pledged Amount), 
LinkedIn Page & CEO LinkedIn 500+, Ln(No. of Backers) and No. of Projects Created in Kickstarter 
help explain our dependant variable Subsequent VC Financing (SubVC), which equals 1 if the campaign 
secured VC funding after its crowdfunding success. The basic structure of our logistic regression model 
is as follows:  
 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑉𝐶(0 1⁄ ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1. 𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽2. 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3. 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛500
+ 𝛽4. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠) + 𝛽5. 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝐾𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟)
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑘. 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑡






The variables under the Additional Controls block include Female_Creator (0/1), Natural_Person (0/1), 
No. of Projects Backed (Kickstarter), Ln(Goal Amount), Duration and ProjectsWeLove (0/1). We do not 
use No. of all CF projects simultaneously in the same equation since it is a linear function of the other 
explanatory variable No. of Projects Created in Kickstarter. In other words, the former is the sum of the 
latter and the number of CF projects created in other platforms, resulting in a correlation coefficient 
close to 1 (~0.974; see Table 4). Therefore, to avoid multicollinearity we use these two variables 
separately in Tables 5 to 7.  
As explained above, we run the above regression for four (4) other dependent variables to explore how 
funding from other sources is affected: SubFin (0/1), SubCF (0/1), SubKickstarter (0/1) and 
SubFin_notCF (0/1) which represent funds secured from all sources combined, crowdfunding platforms 
only, Kickstarter only and all sources other than CF platforms respectively. 
 
Next, we are interested in identifying the potential influence of the abovementioned explanatory 
variables on the number of subsequent VC financing. For this purpose, we employ a Poisson regression 
model as below: 
 
#𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑉𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1. 𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽2. 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3. 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛500
+ 𝛽4. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠) + 𝛽5. 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝐾𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟)
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑘. 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑡








The dependent variable #SubVC represents the counts of subsequent VC rounds secured by the campaign 
after its success in Kickstarter. As before, we also further analyse how pledged amount, LinkedIn 
alliance, number of backers and number of CF projects affect the number of subsequent funding rounds 
from – all sources combined (#SubFin), crowdfunding platforms only (#SubCF), Kickstarter only 
(#SubKickstarter) and sources other than CF (#SubFin_notCF).  
 
Finally we concentrate on the amount raised from subsequent rounds of financing and try to examine 
the changes in it stemmed from our main explanatory variables. For this purpose, we consider the 
following OLS regression model where the dependent variable Ln(Amount_SubVC) is the natural 
logarithm of the total amount (denominated in US dollars) raised by the entrepreneur from VCs after 
the initial campaign success: 
 
𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑉𝐶)
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1. 𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽2. 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3. 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛500
+ 𝛽4. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠) + 𝛽5. 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝐾𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟)
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑘. 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑡







Apart from the amount raised form VCs, we also examine how total amounts raised from-all types of 
sources combined, crowdfunding platforms only, Kickstarter only and from sources other than CF are 





4. Empirical Results 
 
We present the multivariate results in Tables 5 to 7 summarizing evidence from the logistic, Poisson 
and OLS regressions respectively. Column (i) of Table 5 summarizes our results from multivariate 
logistic regressions for the determinants of SubVC(0/1) as in Equation (1). As expected, the coefficients 
of logged pledged amount are positive (row 1), that is in line with Hypothesis 1 (a), we find statistically 
significant empirical evidence that higher pledged amounts significantly raise the probability of getting 
subsequent VC financing (significant at 10% level). More precisely, a 2.72-fold [exp(1)=2.718] rise in 
logged pledged amount is associated with a 55% increase in the likelihood of securing future VC rounds. 
Funding from other sources are also found to be significantly affected by the amount pledged. In row 
(1) we also see higher pledge significantly raises the chances of securing- 1. overall subsequent financing 
[column (ii); significant at 1% level], 2. funding from CF platforms only (column (iii); significant at 5% 
level) and 3. from sources other than CF [column (v), significant at 5% level]. 
 
In rows 2 and 3, we present results of how the entrepreneur’s LinkedIn alliance is related to the project’s 
future fundability. As expected, we find that having well-connected CEOs or founders is statistically 
positively correlated to securing VC funding afterwards (see variable CEO LinkedIn 500+ in column (i) 
of Table 5). Although we find no statistically significant impact for the variable LinkedIn Page despite 
the coefficients showing the expected positive signs as hypothesized under Hypothesis 2(a), we find that 
the broader networks brought about by CEOs with over 500 connections on LinkedIn greatly impacts 
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the probability of attracting future VC rounds. In other words, having a CEO or founder with 500+ 
connections increase the probability of a subsequent VC financing by 112% (significant at a 1% level). 
Apart from VC rounds, such CEOs/founders significantly increase the probability of the project 
obtaining funds from all sources combined [column (ii)] as well as funds from non-CF sources [column 
(iv)]. 
 
As proposed under Hypothesis 3(a), we observe a significant and negative relation between the Ln(no. 
of backers) and the probability of obtaining future VC rounds [row 4, column (i)], conforming to the 
notion that VCs assign a lower utility to projects with large crowds. This variable was also found to be 
negatively impacting (significant at 10% level) the probability of future non-CF rounds as well [column 
(v)]. 
 
For the fourth and final set of hypotheses which links the degree of an entrepreneur’s association with 
crowdfunding with the odds of subsequent VC involvement, we find no statistically significant effect 
[row 5 & 6, column (i)], meaning we cannot reasonably conclude that higher number of crowdfunding 
projects translates into lower probability that entrepreneur will seek VC funding in future. Hypothesis 
4(a) is thus rejected. However, the results in columns (iii) and (iv) show that the higher the number of 
CF projects created, the more the entrepreneur is likely to launch subsequent CF campaigns, particularly 
on Kickstarter- a strongly positive relationship significant at 1% level. Each additional number of 
successful CF project increases the probability of follow-up CF projects being created by the 
entrepreneur by 87% [row (5), column (iii)] and that of follow-up Kickstarter projects by 148% [column 
(iv)]. This finding supports the idea that positive responses from the crowdfunding market increases an 
entrepreneur’s likelihood of becoming a serial crowdfunder (Butticè et al., 2017) and partially support 
our premise for Hypotheses 4 (a-c) that successfully crowdfunded entrepreneurs do and will continue to 
use this platform to raise additional financial resources. Although results do not indicate that this pattern 
will have an effect on future VC involvement.  
 
Before moving on to the next step of our analysis, we check for possible cases of multicollinearity. We 
calculate the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all the regression scenarios and find that the averages 
are below the critical value of 5 (Burchard et al. 2020). The maximum is 1.59 and the means range 




--- please insert Table 5 about here --- 
 
Table 6 shows our results for the Poisson regressions presented in Equation (2) focusing on the number 
of subsequent funding rounds from different sources. We find no statistically significant effect of 
pledged amount on log counts of future VC rounds [row 1, column (i)]. As such, we were unable to 
accept Hypothesis 1(b) where we hypothesized that larger amount of pledged money is positively 
associated with higher number of future VC funding rounds. However, we found that a rise in pledged 
amount translates into a statistically significant rise in- 1. the number of overall subsequent funding 
rounds [row (1), column (ii), at 5% level], 2. the number of future CF rounds [column (iii), at 10% level] 
and 3. the number of all future rounds other than CF [column (v), at 10% level]. 
 
Next, we found that the number of subsequent VC rounds is positively affected by better-connected 
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CEO or founders. Row (3) shows that the difference in the logs of expected counts of future VC rounds 
is expected to be 1.10 more for projects with CEOs who have 500+ connections in LinkedIn compared 
to those with CEOs having connections below the benchmark (significant at 1% level)- a finding in 
agreement with Hypothesis 2(b). Similarly, we also found that CEO’s broader connections helped in 
increasing the firm’s overall number of future funding rounds [column (ii), significant at 5% level] as 
well as the number of rounds other than CF [column (v), significant at 1% level]. Although the variable 
LinkedIn Page wasn’t found to be significantly affecting future counts of VC rounds [row (2), column 
(i)], we found significantly positive relation between the variable and the number of future- 1. overall 
funding rounds [column (2), significant at 5% level]; 2. crowdfunding rounds [column (iii), at 10% 
level] and 3. Kickstarter rounds [column (iv), significant at 1% level], meaning having a LinkedIn page 
associated with the campaign has a positive effect on securing future CF rounds, particularly from 
Kickstarter. 
 
In agreement with Hypothesis 3(b), our results in row (4) show a significant decrease (at 5% level) in 
the number of subsequent VC rounds associated with higher number of backers [column (i)] supporting 
the notion that VCs’ skepticism towards a large backer base negatively affects how many VC rounds 
the campaign  secures. Future counts of non-CF round were also found to be negatively affected by the 
variable Ln(No. of Backers) [column (v)]. 
 
We find no statistically significant evidence that higher number of CF projects created will negatively 
impact the number of subsequent VC rounds, as depicted in hypothesis 4(b). Rows (5) and (6) presents 
the coefficients, however none are statistically significant despite having the expected negative signs. 
As far as the future number of CF projects are concerned, we find similar results as in Table 5. One 
additional successful CF project will raise the difference in the logs of expected number of subsequent 
CF projects by 0.15 [row (6), column (iii), significant at 1% level] and that of subsequent Kickstarter 
projects by 0.14 [row (6), column (iv), at 1% level].  
 
 
--- please insert Table 6 about here --- 
 
Table 7 shows our results for the OLS regressions presented in Equation (3) focusing on how our 
independent variables affect amount raised from subsequent funding rounds from different sources. We 
find statistical significance for Ln(Pledged Amount) exerting positive impact on amount raised from 
future VC rounds [column (i); significant at 5% level]. Therefore, we accept Hypothesis 1(c) which 
stated that larger collected crowdfunding pledges correlate with higher amount of follow-up funding 
from VCs. Ln(Pledged Amount) also shows a positive relation with funding from- 1. all sources 
combined [column (ii); at 1% level]; 2. crowdfunding platforms [column (iii); at 1% level]; 3. 
Kickstarter [column (iv); at 1% level] and 4. non-CF sources [column (v); at 10% level].  
 
However, we find little evidence in support of Hypothesis 2(c) as amounts subsequently raised from 
VCs were not found to be significantly correlated to the campaign’s LinkedIn presence or the number 
of connections the founder has in LinkedIn [rows (2) & (3), column (i)]. Likewise, amounts raised from 
other sources didn’t demonstrate any strong link to the variables LinkedIn and CEO LinkedIn 500+. Due 
to lack of statistical significance, we reject Hypothesis 3(c) as well backer size didn’t demonstrate any 




The results of our OLS regressions provide no support for Hypothesis 4(c) either, meaning higher 
number of CF projects created have no statistically significant impact on the amount raised from 
subsequent VC rounds [rows (5) & (6), column (i)]. However, we found significantly positive relation 
between No. of Projects created (Kickstarter) and subsequent amount raised from CF platforms 
particularly Kicksarter (columns (iii) & (iv); at 1% level), indicating successful entrepreneurs take 
advantage of serial crowdfunding and manage to raise higher amounts from subsequent CF rounds. 
 
 
--- please insert Table 7 about here --- 
A closer look at our additional control variables also reveals some interesting patterns as to how these 
characteristics affect the firm’s future financing. Our results show that probability of obtaining overall 
subsequent financing (all sources combined) is significantly negatively affected (at 1% level) when the 
project creator is a natural person(s) [Table 5, row (8), column (ii)]. Follow-on VC financing and 
crowdfunding probabilities were also found to be decreasing when the campaign was run by individuals 
instead of a business or organization. One reason could be that, small-scale projects run by one person 
or a small group of people meet their goals sooner than larger-scale projects that need repeat funding for 
product enhancement. However, further analyses are necessary to understand the dynamics of this 
argument.  
The results also indicate a strong negative relationship between goal size and future crowdfunding 
outcomes. We find that a higher goal amount significantly reduces the number of subsequent financing 
rounds from all sources combined (at 1% level). The negative association is even stronger (at 1% level) 
when it comes to the number of future crowdfunding campaigns especially in Kickstarter [Table 6, row 
(10), columns (iii) and (iv)]. The negative association persists in case of the probability of getting future 
rounds as well. The results of the logit regression in Table 5 show that the higher the goal, the more it 
reduces the log-odds of having subsequent CF or subsequent Kickstarter rounds (significant at 5% level). 
One possible explanation of this pattern may lie in the fact that Kickstarter follows an “All-or-Nothing” 
(AON) financing model. Entrepreneurs that self-select into the AON model do so in order to signal to 
the crowd that they are committed to only undertake the project if enough capital is raised, which reduces 
the crowd’s risk that undercapitalized projects will be undertaken, as under the “Keep it All” (KIA) 
model. The AON model, therefore reduces the risk to the crowd, thereby enabling the AON 
entrepreneurial firms to set higher goals. As a result, these AON campaigns are more likely to achieve 
their goal, despite the fact that their goals are larger on average (Cumming et al, 2019). Thus they raise 
more money in each campaign, meaning they are more likely to reach their overall project goal faster in 
fewer rounds, which translates into lesser need of running future campaigns. 
We also find female-led projects to have a significantly negative relationship with subsequent number 
of crowdfunding, particularly Kickstarter, campaigns [Table 6, row (7)]. Similarly the amount raised 
from these campaigns are also negatively affected by the gender of the entrepreneur being female. Table 
7, row (7) show a statistically significant decrease of 430,000 USD in raised amount from subsequent 
crowdfunding campaigns for women entrepreneurs compared to male entrepreneurs (at 10% level)  and 
a significant 900,000 USD decrease (at 1% level) in the amounts raised from future Kickstarter 
campaigns for females. The possible explanation for this subsequent decrease in the number and amount 
of follow-on crowdfunding could be a mix of a shift in perception towards female founders and the 
female entrepreneurs’ choice of the crowdfunding platform. Women, in particular, have an advantage 
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of the gender bias where they are deemed more trustworthy business owners than men12, particularly 
among the younger millennial and Gen X generations13- a pattern that has translated into the recent 
finding that campaigns led by women are 32% more successful than those led by men14. In addition to 
this high success rate, female entrepreneurs selecting Kickstarter to run their campaign, hence the AON 
platform, is a clear signal to the crowd that the entrepreneur commits not to undertake the project if not 
enough is raised, which reduces the risk to the crowd. Therefore, on a similar note as to our previous 
argument, this enables them to set higher goals, raise more money, and be more likely to reach their 
stated goals faster, creating the abovementioned negative relationship.  
 
5. Discussions and Limitations 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the factors driving VCs responses to initial crowdfunding 
success of various Kickstarter campaigns. In spite of running a successful campaign the prospect of lack 
of VC funding afterwards still remains considerably high. We therefore attempted to identify certain 
characteristics of successful campaigns that either send investment quality signals to VCs or pose 
uncertainties. Drawing from the previous works on signaling theory, we show larger public investments 
(i.e. pledge amount) signal greater public confidence, meaning market-validation is revealed by the 
amount of money raised in the campaign, translating into significant rise in the probability and amount 
of subsequent VC financing. We also find that founders’ professional connections (in LinkedIn) factor 
in the venture’s future funding success by enabling the entrepreneur to be discovered and provide 
additional information to potential investors VC investors for a better evaluation of the quality of their 
products. In other words, having well-connected CEOs or founders (in LinkedIn) were found to be 
significantly positively correlated to both the probability (of securing) and number of subsequent VC 
rounds. Statistically significant results were found supporting our hypothesis that VCs tend to devalue 
a large crowd of backers, presumably due to future market loss concerns. Both the probability and the 
number of follow-on VC rounds were negatively affected by a high number of backers although no 
significant link was found between backer size and amounts raised from follow-on VC rounds.  
We additionally hypothesized that VCs might still accept a large backer base if the addressable market 
for the product concerned is big enough in the beginning rendering the initial revenue loss as a result of 
the campaign negligible; and rather be skeptic of a large crowd with low contribution per backer. In 
Table 8 we present the regression results where the variable No. of Backers was replaced by 
                                                          
12 “…previous research in the venture capital setting has shown that typically investors will invest in men, because they view 
them to be more competent … But what we found in crowdfunding is that the perception of competence is less important 
because this is such an early stage in a project; what’s more important is whether or not, as a funder, you trust the individual 
behind it. And women, in particular, have an advantage because the gender bias amongst participants was that women are 
more trustworthy than men.” - Regan Stevenson, assistant professor of management and entrepreneurship, Kelley School of 
Business, Indiana University, in an interview with Moneyish.  
Reference link: https://nypost.com/2018/05/14/why-women-are-more-likely-to-be-funded-on-kickstarter/ 
 
13According to a recent study (2017) from payroll and HR solutions site Paychex. Reference link: 
https://www.paychex.com/articles/startup/what-makes-microbusinesses-trustworthy 
14 "Women unbound: Unleashing female entrepreneurial potential": report by PricewaterhouseCoopers (July 2017). 
Reference link: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/about/diversity/womenunbound.html. 
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Backers(Q4)xPledge(Q1) to test whether campaigns with the number of backers at the highest 25th 
percentile and pledges at the lowest 25th percentile affect the VCs decision to partner with the campaign. 
We find no significant effect of our interaction variable on the probability and number of subsequent 
VC funding rounds (Models 1 and 2). However, results of the OLS regression show a positive 
association between campaigns with large number of backers but low pledges and the subsequent 
amount raised from VCs (significant at 5% level). The VIFs are below the critical threshold and show 
no sign of multicollinearity. 
 
 
--- please insert Table 8 about here --- 
 
Switching our focus on to the founder’s incentive to look for VC funding we show that, serial creators 
with back-to-back crowdfunding success are more likely to gain self-confidence about their execution 
ability. We show that higher number of prior successful campaigns translates into higher probability, 
number and size of subsequent crowdfunding rounds. However this strong association was not found to 
be negatively affecting the degree of future VC involvement, as initially hypothesized, so we cannot 
reasonably conclude that higher CF success renders coaching by VC less attractive to entrepreneurs. 
 
This study also sheds light on the broader picture of the firm’s future funding trajectory. Pledged amount 
was not only found to be boosting the probability of obtaining subsequent VC funding, but also funding 
from all types of sources combined (e.g. crowdfunding, seed funds, angel investors, venture capitalists, 
equity crowdfunding, debt financing and others). The number and amount raised from all these sources 
were also found to be significantly positively associated with high pledges. As expected, the results also 
show that higher the pledge, higher the number of subsequent crowdfunding rounds and the amount 
raised through them, meaning successful entrepreneurs capitalizing on their initial campaign successes.  
Consistent with previous research, similar positive results were found for CEOs’ social alliance. 
Probability of the firm’s subsequent funding rounds from all sources combined was found to experience 
a 64% rise [Table 5, column (ii)] thanks to the presence of a CEO with 500+ connections in LinkedIn. 
Similarly, we also found that CEO’s broader connections helped in increasing the firm’s overall number 
of future funding rounds. Number of funding rounds from non-crowdfunding sources also rise with 
having CEOs who have 500+ connections in LinkedIn compared to those with CEOs having fewer 
connections. Number of backers was found to be negatively affecting the probability and number of 
obtaining future non-CF rounds whereas high number of prior successful campaigns was found to be 
significantly raising the probability, number and amount of subsequent CF (particularly Kickstarter) 
rounds. Both these findings complement each other by allowing us to conclude that successful 
entrepreneurs do go back to the crowd for their future financial needs. 
There are some limitations in our study, which may, however, offer opportunities for future research. 
Perhaps the most important limitation stems from the fact that we used manual searches to track VC 
funding histories of sample firms. In addition to browsing numerous news articles, company websites 
and investors’ blog-posts pertaining to the project, company or entrepreneur(s) in question, we also 
utilized Crunchbase, a site that stores information on start-up activity and tracks risk financing within 
and across countries, including the number of investors involved and the type (e.g., VC, business angel, 
private equity, etc.). Full access for academic research on this platform is conditional on applying for a 
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license, which limited our information on subsequent VC funding rounds that we extracted from the site. 
Gaining complete access would have made more funding data available and allowed us to create a richer 
dataset for this study. 
Another limitation is that this study is based on the sample from one single crowdfunding platform, 
Kickstarter, and utilizes the campaigns raising at least five hundred thousand (500,000) US dollars in 
the fields of design, games and technology. We know that many crowdfunding platforms (Indiegogo, 
Crowdfunder UK, RocketHub etc.) have different features that might affect the campaign coverage, the 
amount raised, and even its success or failure. Additional studies with crowdfunding projects collected 
from multiple reward-based platforms should hence be done to test the robustness of our results across 
platforms. Beyond reward-based platforms, crowdfunding has also expanded into many different 
directions in the past decade, including peer-to-peer lending, real estate, donation and equity-
crowdfunding platforms. Of course, each of these platforms have their own unique features which could 
bring additional insights. This presents an interesting opportunity for future research. 
Another possible extension of this study could be incorporating the geographic effects on VC funding 
since, among a variety of factors, proximity to funders has been strongly linked to receiving venture 
capital funding (Agrawal et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2010; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003a) due to the need of 
investors to monitor their investments. Therefore, introducing the big city clustering effect as a control 
alongside industry fixed effects may shed some light on how the geographic region (state) of the start-
up under analysis affect its VC funding success.  
Not all successful crowdfunding leads to the successful development and delivery of goods and services. 
Crowdfunded projects are at risk of delays, or even failure if initial resource endowments prove to be 
inadequate. Overfunded projects are even more vulnerable to delay, likely due to the increased 
complexity and expectations associated with large projects (Mollick 2014). Colombo & Shafi (2016) 
showed that, non-VC backed firms that show delay in delivering their product are less likely to receive 
initial external financing unless there is positive crowd feedback. As delays are common, it would be 
interesting to include the degree of delay as an additional control to investigate its effect on the firm’s 
future fundability. 
Lastly, as we have shown, raising more money with more backers from crowdfunding can sometimes 
adversely affect access to VC financing, an interesting future research question could be how to design 




For start-ups, a successful campaign could generate significant opportunities to access additional 
funding resources. This paper contributes to advancing our understanding of how a successful 
Kickstarter campaign may determine a start-up’s follow-on fundraising performance, with a special 
focus on future VC financing. A 1% increase in the annual number of Kickstarter campaigns in one year 
leads to a 0.097% increase in the annual number of VC investments in the following year, a 0.092% 
increase in the subsequent year, and about a 0.067% increase in the third year (Sorenson et al., 2016). 
No doubt, successful campaigns do address the attention of VCs, that is, where the crowd provides 
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signals through aggregated investments, the VC market responds. However a successful campaign does 
not necessarily guarantee the support of VCs and it is vital to explore factors that have a considerable 
impact on their investment decisions. We draw a picture of a financing eco-system where not only VCs 
pay a great deal of attention to the venture quality and level of uncertainty that the firms provide but 
also the entrepreneurs’ incentive to seek VC funding plays a key role. Our findings offer important 
implications for crowdfunding entrepreneurs seeking future endorsements from VCs. The results 
indicate that setting the right target that maximizes pledge is crucial and maintaining a robust network 
on LinkedIn is interpreted as a strong quality signal. Since a large backer base was found to be negatively 
impacting the chances and number of future VC involvement, designing an efficient reward structure to 
encourage higher contribution per backer might prove to be beneficial. We believe, however, that the 
list of the hypotheses used for this study is not exhaustive and future research can contribute to our 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
This table shows the campaign categories, as well as the number of campaigns and amounts raised in USD (Vol. in millions) for each respective 
year between 2010 and 2017 (panel A). Panel B shows the distribution of campaigns across different countries. 
Panel A 
Business Category 2010 Vol. 2011 Vol. 2012 Vol. 2013 Vol. 2014 Vol. 2015 Vol. 2016 Vol. 2017 Vol. Total Total 
3D Printing 0 - 0 - 0 - 2 2.07 5 7.77 2 3.55 3 2.78 3 3.55 15 19.72 
Architecture 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 0.68 1 0.51 2 1.19 
Camera Equipment 0 - 0 - 1 0.55 0 - 2 2.68 4 2.83 4 2.72 5 6.81 16 15.59 
Design 0 - 0 - 0 - 3 2.20 1 0.75 3 3.15 0 - 3 3.16 10 9.26 
DIY Electronics 0 - 0 - 2 1.12 2 1.21 2 1.25 0 - 2 1.39 0 - 8 4.97 
Fabrication Tools 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 0.63 2 1.70 2 2.41 2 2.01 7 6.75 
Flight 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 2 2.16 1 0.88 0 - 0 - 3 3.04 
Gadgets 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 0.50 1 0.65 9 8.72 11 8.38 8 8.20 30 26.45 
Games 0 - 0 - 1 0.73 1 0.56 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 2 1.29 
Gaming Hardware 0 - 0 - 2 11.03 1 1.11 0 - 0 - 1 0.50 0 - 4 12.64 
Graphic Design  0 - 0 - 0 - 1 0.59 1 0.80 0 - 0 - 0 - 2 1.39 
Hardware 0 - 1 0.83 2 1.41 11 10.30 15 12.95 9 9.79 11 12.56 3 2.08 52 49.93 
Playing Cards 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 0.63 1 0.63 
Product Design 1 0.94 0 - 9 16.72 12 11.33 12 23.83 28 39.75 46 46.23 25 30.21 133 169.02 
Robots 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 4 3.41 0 - 1 1.15 5 4.56 
Software 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 0.75 0 - 0 - 1 1.08 0 - 2 1.83 
Sound 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 2 6.90 1 0.81 7 10.03 2 3.42 12 21.17 
Space Exploration 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 1.51 1 1.05 2 1.96 0 - 0 - 4 4.52 
Tabletop Games 0 - 0 - 4 5.65 10 11.64 2 1.82 11 20.52 20 25.87 11 12.06 58 77.57 
Technology 0 - 0 - 5 6.54 4 3.19 4 5.05 11 13.46 9 11.46 2 1.37 35 41.07 
Video Games 0 - 0 - 20 27.16 19 26.04 4 3.97 11 22.36 4 3.84 3 4.76 61 88.12 
Wearables 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 2 1.47 5 5.66 9 9.84 4 8.09 20 25.07 
Web 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 5.41 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 5.41 






Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Australia 0 0 1 1 2 2 7 2 15 
Belgium 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Canada 0 0 1 3 1 3 7 2 17 
China 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 2 8 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
France 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 7 
Germany 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 2 9 
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Israel 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 5 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 
Japan 0 0 0 2 1 4 1 0 8 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
New Zealand 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Norway 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Russia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Sweden 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 0 6 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 5 
Taiwan 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
United Kingdom 0 0 4 4 2 7 5 5 27 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
United States 1 1 37 53 46 73 91 50 352 












Table 2: Variable Descriptions 
This table gives a detailed description of all the dependent and main explanatory variables along with the 
additional controls used in our analysis. 
 
Variable name Description 
Dependent Variables 
SubVC (0/1) Dummy variable indicating whether a campaign secured VC funding after its 
crowdfunding success that equals 1 if a VC round is recorded for a campaign, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
SubFin (0/1) Dummy variable indicating whether a campaign secured financing of any kind 
(e.g. crowdfunding, VC, angel, seed, equity crowdfunding, debt etc.) after its 
crowdfunding success that equals 1 if a financing round is recorded for a 
campaign, and 0 otherwise. 
SubCF (0/1) Dummy variable indicating whether a campaign raised funds from a 
crowdfunding platform post its crowdfunding success that equals 1 if a CF round 
is recorded for a campaign, and 0 otherwise. 
SubKickstarter (0/1) Dummy variable indicating whether a campaign raised funds from Kickstarter 
post its initial crowdfunding success that equals 1 if a Kickstarter round is 
recorded for a campaign, and 0 otherwise. 
SubFin_notCF (0/1) Dummy variable indicating whether a campaign raised funds from a source other 
than a crowdfunding platform post its crowdfunding success that equals 1 if such 
a non-CF round is recorded for a campaign, and 0 otherwise. 
#SubVC Total number of VC rounds secured by the campaign after its crowdfunding 
success. 
#SubFin Total number of financing rounds secured by the campaign from all types of 
sources (e.g. crowdfunding, VC, angel, seed, equity crowdfunding, debt etc.) after 
its crowdfunding success. 
#SubCF Total number of subsequent crowdfunding campaigns successfully conducted by 
the campaign creators after their crowdfunding success. 
#SubKickstarter Total number of subsequent Kickstarter campaigns successfully conducted by the 
campaign creators after their crowdfunding success. 
#SubFin_notCF Total number of subsequent financing rounds the campaign secured from all 
sources other than from a crowdfunding platform after the initial success. 
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Ln(Amount_SubVC) Natural logarithm of the total amount raised from subsequent VC rounds. For 
rounds in other currencies, the USD equivalent is calculated based on the exchange 
rate on the day the round was secured. 
 
Ln(Amount_SubFin) Natural logarithm of the total amount of subsequent financing received from all 
types of sources (e.g. crowdfunding, VC, angel, seed, equity crowdfunding, debt 
etc.) after the crowdfunding success. For amounts in other currencies, the USD 
equivalent is calculated based on the exchange rate on the day the amount was 
raised. 
 
Ln(Amount_SubCF) Natural logarithm of the total amount raised from subsequent crowdfunding 
campaigns after the initial campaign success. For campaigns with amounts in other 
currencies, the USD equivalent is calculated based on the exchange rate on the day 
the campaign successfully ended. 
 
Ln(Amount_SubKickstarter) Natural logarithm of the total amount raised from subsequent Kickstarter 
campaigns after the initial campaign success. For campaigns with amounts in other 
currencies, the USD equivalent is calculated based on the exchange rate on the day 
the campaign successfully ended. 
 
Ln(Amount_SubFin_notCF) Natural logarithm of the total amount raised from all subsequent financing rounds 
except from a crowdfunding platform. For rounds with amounts in other 
currencies, the USD equivalent is calculated based on the exchange rate on the day 
the funding was raised. 
 
Independent Variables 
Ln(Pledged Amount) Natural logarithm of the total amount raised (in USD) by the campaign. For 
campaigns with amounts in other currencies, the USD equivalent is calculated 
based on the annual average exchange rate (corresponding to the year the 
campaign was launched).  
 
LinkedIn Page Dummy variable that equals 1 if a link to a LinkedIn page associated with the 
campaign or that of the creator(s) is provided, and 0 otherwise.  
 
CEOLinkedIn500+ Dummy variable that equals 1 if the campaign CEO or founder (if no CEO is 
mentioned) has 500 or more contacts on LinkedIn, and 0 otherwise. 
Ln(No. of Backers) Natural logarithm of the total number of backers of the crowdfunding project.  
 
Backers(Q4)xPledge(Q1) Dummy variable that equals 1 if a campaign has the number of backers in the 
highest 25th percentile and the pledged amount in the lowest 25th percentile, and 
0 otherwise. 
No. of Projects Created 
(Kickstarter) 
Total number of Kickstarter projects created by the creator since joining the 
portal.  
 








Female Creator Dummy variable that equals 1 if the project creator(s) is a female, and 0 otherwise. 
Natural Person Dummy variable that equals 1 if the project creator is one/more than one natural 
person(s), and 0 otherwise.  
 
No. of Projects Backed  
(Kickstarter) 
Total number of Kickstarter projects backed by the creator since joining the 
portal.  
 
Ln(Goal Amount) Natural logarithm of the funding goal (in USD) set by the creator of the project 
before the start date of the campaign. For campaigns with amounts in other 
currencies, the USD equivalent is calculated based on the annual average 
exchange rate (corresponding to the year the campaign was launched).  
 
Duration Number of days between the campaign’s end date and start date.  
 
Projects We Love Dummy variable that equals 1 if the project is marked as “Project We Love” in 





















Table 3: Summary Statistics  
This table gives descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, min, and max) for the full sample (483 
campaigns) shown in Table 1. All variables shown in this table are considered in subsequent analyses for 
testing our hypotheses, except for the variables concerning the amount raised from various sources 
(variables 11 to 15) (see Table 2 for variable descriptions) whose natural logarithms are used in our 
regressions. Similarly the statistics for Pledged Amount (USD) and Goal Amount (USD) are also reported 
using their nominal values instead of their log values.  
 
Variable #Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables 
(1)   SubVC (0/1) 483 0.13 0.34 0 1 
(2)   SubFin (0/1) 483 0.54 0.50 0 1 
(3)   SubCF (0/1) 483 0.43 0.50 0 1 
(4)   SubKickstarter(0/1) 483 0.28 0.45 0 1 
(5)   SubFin_notCF(0/1) 483 0.16 0.37 0 1 
(6)   #SubVC 483 0.17 0.47 0 3 
(7)   #SubFin 483 1.11 2.21 0 28 
(8)   #SubCF 483 0.90 2.16 0 27 
(9)   #SubKickstarter 483 0.68 2.11 0 27 
(10) #SubFin_notCF 483 0.21 0.52 0 3 
(11) Amount_SubVC 483 1,859,920 7,750,019.58 0 91,000,000 
(12) Amount_SubFin 483 7,064,186 86,255,584.25 0 1,880,717,867 
(13) Amount_SubCF 483 854,172 2,792,630.51 0 37,449,489 
(14) Amount_ SubKickstarter 483 541,311 2,611,793.24 0 37,449,489 
(15) Amount_SubFin_notCF 483 6,210,014 86,174,904.81 0 1,880,000,000 
Main Explanatory Variables 
(16)  Pledged Amount 483 1,224,069.56 1,290,033.30 500,784 13,285226 
      
(17)  LinkedIn Page 483 0.76 0.43 0 1 
      
(18)  CEOLinkedIn500+ 330 0.75 0.43 0 1 
      
(19)  No. of Backers 
 
483 10,573.09 17,424.68 211 219,382 
(20)  No. of Projects Created 
(Kickstarter) 
483 2.19 2.81 0 28 
(21)  No. of all CF Projects 483 1.40 2.75 0 27 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics (Cont’d) 
 
Variable #Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Additional Control Variables 
(22)  Female Creator 395 0.11 0.31 0 1 
(23)  Natural Person 483 0.18 0.38 0 1 
(24)  No. of Projects Backed  
(Kickstarter) 
483 21.28 43.09 0 328 
(25)  Goal Amount 483 160,446.87 254,072.76 
 
5,000 2,004,811.55 
(26)  Duration 483 37.18 9.65 16 60 























Table 4: Correlation Matrix  
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for the main explanatory variables and the additional controls. All of the following variables 
are considered in subsequent analyses for testing our hypotheses (see Table 2 for variable descriptions) except for Pledged Amount (USD) and Goal 
Amount (USD) whose natural logarithms are used in our regressions. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at least at a 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Pledged Amount 1 
           
(2) LinkedIn Page 0.07 1 
    
 
 
     
(3) CEOLinkedIn500 0.04 0.57*** 1 
         
(4) No. of Backers 0.68*** 0.04 0.00 1 
        
(5) No. of Projects 
Created (Kickstarter) 
-0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 1 
       
(6) No. of all CF 
Projects 
-0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.97*** 1 
      
(7) Female Creator -0.12*** 0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.09* -0.09* 1 
     
(8) Natural Person 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.09** 0.11** 0.09** -0.23*** 1 
    
(9) No. of Projects 
Backed (Kickstarter) 
0.15*** 0.06 0.08* 0.27*** 0.40*** 0.38*** -0.02 0.21*** 1 
   
(10) Goal Amount 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.10** -0.08* -0.10**  0.00 -0.09* -0.03 1 
  
(11) Duration 0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03  0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11** 1 
 
(12) Projects We Love 0.09** 0.18*** 0.07 0.13***  0.05  0.00 -0.10**   0.00 0.08* 0.11** -0.19*** 1 
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Table 5: Multivariate Analysis of factors affecting the probability of subsequent financing 
In this table, we apply logistic regressions to analyze how the factors surrounding a successful Kickstarter campaign affect subsequent funding, particularly future 
VC investments. The dependent variables for models (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) are SubVC, SubFin, SubCF, SubKickstarter and SubFin_notCF respectively, all of 
which equal 1 if funding from the respective source was obtained, and 0 otherwise. Under each model, two sets of results are reported since variables (5) and (6) 
were used separately to avoid multicollinearity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Main Explanatory Variables 






















































































































































































































































Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.29 0.20 0.40 0.43 0.48 0.25 0.25 
Variance Inflation Factors (mean) 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 
Variance Inflation Factors (max) 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 
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Table 6: Multivariate Analysis of factors affecting the number of subsequent financing 
In this table, we apply Poisson regressions to analyze how the factors surrounding a successful Kickstarter campaign affect the number subsequent funding, 
particularly that of future VC investments. The dependent variables for models (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) are #SubVC, #SubFin, #SubCF, #SubKickstarter and 
#SubFin_notCF respectively. Under each model, two sets of results are reported since variables (5) and (6) were used separately to avoid multicollinearity. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Main Explanatory Variables 






















































































































































































































































Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.23 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.40 0.49 0.50 0.24 0.24 
Variance Inflation Factors (mean) 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 
Variance Inflation Factors (max) 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 
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Table 7: Multivariate Analysis of factors affecting the amount of subsequent financing 
In this table, we apply OLS regressions to analyze how the factors surrounding a successful Kickstarter campaign affect the amount raised from subsequent 
funding(in millions). The dependent variables for models (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) are Ln(Amount_SubVC), Ln(Amount_SubFin), Ln(Amount_SubCF), 
Ln(Amount_SubKickstarter) and Ln(Amount_SubFin_notCF) respectively. Under each model, two sets of results are reported since variables (5) and (6) were used 
separately to avoid multicollinearity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Main Explanatory Variables 






















































































































































































































































Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 65 65 259 259 208 208 139 139 78 78 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.27 0.06 0.06 
Variance Inflation Factors (mean) 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 
Variance Inflation Factors (max) 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 
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Table 8: Multivariate Analysis of factors affecting the probability, number and amount of 
subsequent VC financing 
In this table, we apply logistic, Poisson and OLS regressions in Models 1, 2 and 3 respectively to analyze 
how the factors surrounding a successful Kickstarter campaign affect subsequent VC investments. We 
replace the variable No. of Backers with Backers(Q4)xPledge(Q1) to capture the effect of a high-backer-
low-pledge campaign on the VCs’ decisions. The dependent variables for models 1, 2 and 3 are SubVC, # 
SubVC and Ln(Amount_SubVC) respectively. SubVC equals 1 if funding from the VCs was obtained, and 
0 otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Main Explanatory Variables 











































































Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 480 482 65 
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.22 0.48 
VIF (mean) 1.22 1.22 1.22 
VIF (max) 1.54 1.54 1.54 
 
